fix: full review pass (main process, voice pipeline, Hermes client, HUD) and e2e-validated local voice (v2.1.0.1)

Electron main
- utility-process channel: sherpa output copied into V8 buffers (Electron rejects external
  buffers), audio exchanged as base64; worker restart on timeout, identity-safe exit handling,
  deterministic native unload by restart
- webhook: loopback by default without secret, UTF-8-safe body assembly, clean restart, port validation
- files IPC: realpath-based root check, openPath allow-list (reveal-only outside document folders),
  Windows reserved names; store: debounced async atomic writes with backup of corrupt files;
  logger: streaming writes with rotation; log message size cap
- HTTP stream proxy: socket released on idle timeout / renderer destroyed, id validation
- model manager: inactivity timeout, retrying rm/rename (Windows locks), engine stopped before
  replacing a model; WAV decoder handles float/24-bit; IPC payload validation
- window: opaque rounded window on Windows, navigation lock-down, visibility events;
  Ctrl+Alt+Escape instead of the Task Manager shortcut; single-instance guard; EVEFLOW_USER_DATA

Voice pipeline
- abort semantics (SendHandle.aborted), abort before the stream opens, session id prefixes per transport
- hands-free re-arm after replies without speech, start/stop race, no chime on auto re-arm,
  no silence shipped to STT (400 ms pre-roll), no transcription of empty manual stops
- TTS: bounded prefetch, cancellable segments, non-interrupting notices, volume applied at play time
- SSE CRLF split, usage in chat completions, finish_reason length, phonetic regex hoisted

HUD
- core renderer: no canvas shadows, cached colours, reusable spectrum buffer, theme read on change,
  30 fps idle, stops when the window is hidden; ping flashes on send / tool / speech
- deltas coalesced per animation frame; stable auto-scroll; narrow selectors everywhere
- bundled fonts (offline), reduce-motion fix, error toasts, ops drawer below 1180 px,
  interim transcript and first-token latency in the core caption, Ctrl+K, dialog semantics,
  switch/aria roles, compact widget cleanup, Whisper small recommended for French
- docs/ROADMAP.md: audit results, e2e results and the plan towards a real JARVIS

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017Wn5VX9HNbJ7N54hR24u9Y

electron/ipc/files.ts

@@ -22,12 +22,25 @@ const READABLE_EXT: Record<string, string> = {
   '.html': 'text/html'
 };
 
-const FORBIDDEN_EXT = new Set([
-  '.exe', '.bat', '.cmd', '.ps1', '.vbs', '.msi', '.scr', '.pif', '.reg', '.sh',
-  '.com', '.hta', '.vbe', '.wsf', '.lnk', '.jar', '.dll', '.js', '.jse'
+/** Documents and media the assistant may open with the default application. */
+const OPENABLE_EXT = new Set([
+  ...Object.keys(READABLE_EXT),
+  '.pdf', '.docx', '.doc', '.xlsx', '.xls', '.pptx', '.ppt', '.odt', '.ods', '.odp', '.rtf',
+  '.mp3', '.wav', '.ogg', '.flac', '.mp4', '.mkv', '.webm', '.zip', '.7z', '.py', '.ts', '.tsx', '.yaml', '.yml', '.toml', '.ini'
 ]);
 
+const FORBIDDEN_EXT = new Set([
+  '.exe', '.bat', '.cmd', '.ps1', '.vbs', '.msi', '.scr', '.pif', '.reg', '.sh', '.com', '.hta', '.vbe', '.wsf', '.lnk',
+  '.jar', '.dll', '.js', '.jse', '.pyw', '.msc', '.cpl', '.inf', '.url', '.scf', '.website', '.appref-ms', '.application',
+  '.gadget', '.psm1', '.psd1', '.ps1xml', '.wsh', '.wsc', '.sct', '.desktop', '.app', '.command', '.appimage', '.run'
+]);
+
+const WIN_RESERVED = /^(CON|PRN|AUX|NUL|COM[1-9]|LPT[1-9])(\..*)?$/i;
+
+let sharedDir: string | null = null;
+
 export function getSharedDirectory(): string {
+  if (sharedDir && fs.existsSync(sharedDir)) return sharedDir;
   const candidates = [
     path.join(os.homedir(), 'Documents', 'EveFlow_Shared'),
     path.join(app.getPath('userData'), 'shared')
@@ -35,32 +48,60 @@ export function getSharedDirectory(): string {
   for (const dir of candidates) {
     try {
       fs.mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true });
+      sharedDir = dir;
       return dir;
     } catch {
       /* try next candidate */
     }
   }
-  return app.getPath('temp');
+  sharedDir = app.getPath('temp');
+  return sharedDir;
 }
 
 function normalizeSafe(filePath: string): string {
-  if (!filePath || typeof filePath !== 'string') throw new Error('Chemin invalide');
+  if (!filePath || typeof filePath !== 'string' || filePath.length > 4096) throw new Error('Chemin invalide');
   const normalized = path.normalize(filePath);
   if (normalized.split(/[\\/]/).includes('..')) throw new Error('Traversee de repertoire refusee');
   return normalized;
 }
 
+function allowedRoots(): string[] {
+  return [
+    getSharedDirectory(),
+    path.join(os.homedir(), 'Documents'),
+    path.join(os.homedir(), 'Pictures'),
+    path.join(os.homedir(), 'Downloads'),
+    path.join(os.homedir(), 'Desktop'),
+    app.getPath('temp')
+  ].map((r) => path.resolve(r));
+}
+
+function isInside(root: string, target: string): boolean {
+  const rel = path.relative(root, target);
+  return rel === '' || (!rel.startsWith('..') && !path.isAbsolute(rel));
+}
+
+/** Resolves symlinks and checks the real path against the allowed roots (prefix tricks like "bob-backup" are rejected). */
 function isInsideAllowedRoots(target: string): boolean {
-  const roots = [getSharedDirectory(), os.homedir(), app.getPath('temp')];
-  const resolved = path.resolve(target);
-  return roots.some((root) => resolved.startsWith(path.resolve(root)));
+  let resolved: string;
+  try {
+    resolved = fs.realpathSync.native(target);
+  } catch {
+    return false;
+  }
+  return allowedRoots().some((root) => isInside(root, resolved));
 }
 
 function stripFileScheme(value: string): string {
-  let out = value.replace(/^file:\/\//, '');
+  if (!/^file:\/\//i.test(value)) return value;
+  let out = value.replace(/^file:\/\//i, '');
   // file:///C:/x -> /C:/x on Windows-style paths
   if (/^\/[a-zA-Z]:/.test(out)) out = out.slice(1);
-  return decodeURIComponent(out);
+  try {
+    return decodeURIComponent(out);
+  } catch {
+    return out;
+  }
 }
 
 export function registerFilesIpc(): void {
@@ -78,8 +119,16 @@ export function registerFilesIpc(): void {
 
   ipcMain.handle(IPC.writeSharedFile, async (_e, filename: string, content: string, isBase64 = false) => {
     if (!filename || typeof filename !== 'string') throw new Error('Nom de fichier invalide');
+    if (typeof content !== 'string' || content.length > 50 * 1024 * 1024) throw new Error('Contenu invalide');
     const safeName = path.basename(filename);
-    if (safeName !== filename || safeName.startsWith('.') || /[<>:"|?*]/.test(safeName)) {
+    if (
+      safeName !== filename ||
+      safeName.startsWith('.') ||
+      /[<>:"|?*\u0000-\u001f]/.test(safeName) ||
+      WIN_RESERVED.test(safeName) ||
+      /[. ]$/.test(safeName) ||
+      safeName.length > 200
+    ) {
       throw new Error('Nom de fichier non securise');
     }
     const ext = path.extname(safeName).toLowerCase();
@@ -97,10 +146,17 @@ export function registerFilesIpc(): void {
 
   ipcMain.handle(IPC.openPath, async (_e, filePath: string) => {
     const target = normalizeSafe(stripFileScheme(filePath));
-    const ext = path.extname(target).toLowerCase();
-    if (FORBIDDEN_EXT.has(ext)) throw new Error(`Ouverture refusee pour ${ext}`);
     if (!fs.existsSync(target)) throw new Error('Fichier introuvable');
-    const result = await shell.openPath(target);
+    const real = await fs.promises.realpath(target);
+    const stat = await fs.promises.stat(real);
+    const ext = path.extname(real).toLowerCase();
+    if (!stat.isDirectory() && (FORBIDDEN_EXT.has(ext) || !OPENABLE_EXT.has(ext))) throw new Error(`Ouverture refusee pour ${ext || 'ce fichier'}`);
+    // Outside the user's document folders we only reveal the file, never execute its handler.
+    if (!isInsideAllowedRoots(real)) {
+      shell.showItemInFolder(real);
+      return true;
+    }
+    const result = await shell.openPath(real);
     if (result) throw new Error(result);
     return true;
   });