fix(backend): harden security and speed up feeds and article API

Security:
- WebSocket events are routed to their owner only (no cross-user leak);
  hub close is idempotent (fixes double-close panic), adds ping/pong and
  write deadlines.
- Session tokens stored as SHA-256 (migration 008 keeps sessions valid);
  single-query auth middleware puts the user in the request context.
- Client IP only trusts X-Forwarded-For from TRUSTED_PROXIES; rate limiter
  map is bounded; per-user limit on AI summaries.
- Argon2id at OWASP minimum with a concurrency cap; constant-time login
  for unknown emails; atomic first-admin bootstrap; REGISTRATION_ENABLED.
- CSP/HSTS/COOP headers, same-origin guard on mutations, body size limits,
  wider SSRF denylist, bounded feed/page/AI response reads, generic errors.
- Upgrade chi, pgx, x/net, x/text, x/crypto (known CVEs); commit go.sum.

Performance:
- List endpoints return a plain-text excerpt and reading time instead of
  full HTML; content is sanitized once at ingest (legacy rows backfilled).
- Keyset pagination on (sort_at, id) with matching partial indexes;
  redundant indexes dropped (migration 007).
- Fetcher: bounded worker pool, conditional GET (ETag/Last-Modified),
  exponential backoff, dedupe before insert, column-safe truncation,
  retention-aware ingest, per-user refresh coalescing.
- Read/favorite/read-all are single ownership-scoped statements.
- gzip compression, immutable caching for hashed assets, path-safe SPA
  handler, server timeouts; expired sessions purged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Antigravity AgentandClaude Opus 5.5 committed 2026-10-09 07:34:08 +02:00
1 parent d037e2be34
commit 03e57e4308
40 files changed
+2231 -1898

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+41 -13
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@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ package repository
import (
"context"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/hex"
"errors"
"fmt"
@@ -12,6 +14,9 @@ import (
)
// SessionRepository implements domain.SessionRepository using PostgreSQL.
//
// Only the SHA-256 of a session token is stored, so a database leak does not
// hand out live sessions. Callers always pass the raw token.
type SessionRepository struct {
pool *pgxpool.Pool
}
@@ -21,6 +26,12 @@ func NewSessionRepository(pool *pgxpool.Pool) *SessionRepository {
return &SessionRepository{pool: pool}
}
// hashToken returns the hex SHA-256 of a raw session token.
func hashToken(token string) string {
sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(token))
return hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])
}
// Create inserts a new session into the database.
func (r *SessionRepository) Create(session *domain.Session) error {
ctx := context.Background()
@@ -33,7 +44,7 @@ func (r *SessionRepository) Create(session *domain.Session) error {
_, err := r.pool.Exec(ctx, query,
session.ID,
session.UserID,
session.Token,
hashToken(session.Token),
session.ExpiresAt,
session.CreatedAt,
session.UserAgent,
@@ -47,22 +58,21 @@ func (r *SessionRepository) Create(session *domain.Session) error {
return nil
}
// GetByToken retrieves a session by its token.
// GetByToken retrieves a non-expired session by its raw token.
func (r *SessionRepository) GetByToken(token string) (*domain.Session, error) {
ctx := context.Background()
query := `
SELECT id, user_id, token, expires_at, created_at, user_agent, ip_address
SELECT id, user_id, expires_at, created_at, user_agent, ip_address
FROM sessions
WHERE token = $1 AND expires_at > NOW()
`
var session domain.Session
var userAgent, ipAddress *string
err := r.pool.QueryRow(ctx, query, token).Scan(
err := r.pool.QueryRow(ctx, query, hashToken(token)).Scan(
&session.ID,
&session.UserID,
&session.Token,
&session.ExpiresAt,
&session.CreatedAt,
&userAgent,
@@ -76,22 +86,40 @@ func (r *SessionRepository) GetByToken(token string) (*domain.Session, error) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("getting session by token: %w", err)
}
if userAgent != nil {
session.UserAgent = *userAgent
}
if ipAddress != nil {
session.IPAddress = *ipAddress
}
session.Token = token
session.UserAgent = deref(userAgent)
session.IPAddress = deref(ipAddress)
return &session, nil
}
// Delete removes a session by its token.
// GetUserByToken resolves a raw session token to its user in one round trip.
// Returns nil, nil when the session is unknown or expired.
func (r *SessionRepository) GetUserByToken(ctx context.Context, token string) (*domain.User, error) {
const query = `
SELECT u.id, u.email, u.created_at, u.role
FROM sessions s
JOIN users u ON u.id = s.user_id
WHERE s.token = $1 AND s.expires_at > NOW()`
var u domain.User
err := r.pool.QueryRow(ctx, query, hashToken(token)).Scan(&u.ID, &u.Email, &u.CreatedAt, &u.Role)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
return nil, nil
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("resolving session: %w", err)
}
u.IsAdmin = u.Role == domain.RoleAdmin
return &u, nil
}
// Delete removes a session by its raw token.
func (r *SessionRepository) Delete(token string) error {
ctx := context.Background()
query := `DELETE FROM sessions WHERE token = $1`
_, err := r.pool.Exec(ctx, query, token)
_, err := r.pool.Exec(ctx, query, hashToken(token))
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("deleting session: %w", err)
}