Security:
- WebSocket events are routed to their owner only (no cross-user leak);
hub close is idempotent (fixes double-close panic), adds ping/pong and
write deadlines.
- Session tokens stored as SHA-256 (migration 008 keeps sessions valid);
single-query auth middleware puts the user in the request context.
- Client IP only trusts X-Forwarded-For from TRUSTED_PROXIES; rate limiter
map is bounded; per-user limit on AI summaries.
- Argon2id at OWASP minimum with a concurrency cap; constant-time login
for unknown emails; atomic first-admin bootstrap; REGISTRATION_ENABLED.
- CSP/HSTS/COOP headers, same-origin guard on mutations, body size limits,
wider SSRF denylist, bounded feed/page/AI response reads, generic errors.
- Upgrade chi, pgx, x/net, x/text, x/crypto (known CVEs); commit go.sum.
Performance:
- List endpoints return a plain-text excerpt and reading time instead of
full HTML; content is sanitized once at ingest (legacy rows backfilled).
- Keyset pagination on (sort_at, id) with matching partial indexes;
redundant indexes dropped (migration 007).
- Fetcher: bounded worker pool, conditional GET (ETag/Last-Modified),
exponential backoff, dedupe before insert, column-safe truncation,
retention-aware ingest, per-user refresh coalescing.
- Read/favorite/read-all are single ownership-scoped statements.
- gzip compression, immutable caching for hashed assets, path-safe SPA
handler, server timeouts; expired sessions purged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- XSS stocké (critique) : sanitisation bluemonday sur tous les endpoints
d'articles (List, ListByFeed, Favorites, Search, Get), pas seulement Get
- SSRF (élevé) : nouveau utils/safehttp.go (ValidateExternalURL + client durci
via Dialer.Control, bloque IP privées/loopback/link-local/metadata,
anti-DNS-rebinding et limite de redirections) appliqué à l'extracteur et au parser
- WebSocket CSWSH (élevé) : politique same-origin + override WS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS
- rate-limiting (moyen) : token-bucket en mémoire sur /auth/*
- token de session retiré du corps JSON (json:"-"), livré uniquement par le
cookie HttpOnly
- cookie Secure correct derrière un reverse-proxy (X-Forwarded-Proto +
override COOKIE_SECURE)
- admin : interdiction de supprimer son propre compte
- en-têtes de sécurité (nosniff, X-Frame-Options, Referrer-Policy,
Permissions-Policy)
Note : backend non compilé localement (pas de toolchain Go) ; à valider via Docker.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Antigravity AgentandClaude Opus 5.5
MichaelandClaude Opus 4.8