Claude
8a314991d3
Replaces the demo module behind the team directory and the employee record with scoped queries, and adds contracts, amendments, work permits and the forfait-jours fields. Writing the end-to-end test exposed a modelling error worth naming: first and last names lived only on User, so an employee without an application account had no name at all — the directory rendered "— Salarié E0007". Most sales staff never sign in, and the personnel register requires their name, so the name belongs to the record, not to the login. Moved to EmployeeProfile with a data migration that carries the existing names down from User. Contract rules are pure functions tested at the boundaries. The case that matters is an open-ended contract: a CDI with no end date overlaps every later period, which a naive comparison of two date pairs misses, and two overlapping active contracts would count one employee twice in payroll. The check runs inside the transaction, not only in the form. Forfait jours is refused without a written individual agreement and a dated employee consent: without them the arrangement is unenforceable, and enabling it would also switch off every weekly-duration control. Salary and bank details are not merely hidden when the capability is missing — they are never loaded. A field absent from the response cannot leak through HTML, a log or an error message. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Cr9dkEHwbDgkWPnyGj1Rjv
98 lines
2.9 KiB
TypeScript
98 lines
2.9 KiB
TypeScript
import {
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createCipheriv,
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createDecipheriv,
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randomBytes,
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timingSafeEqual,
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createHash,
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} from 'node:crypto';
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import { env } from '@/lib/env';
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/**
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* Chiffrement applicatif des colonnes sensibles — PLAN.md §3.6.
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*
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* NIR, IBAN, BIC et secrets MFA. AES-256-GCM : le mode authentifié détecte
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* qu'un chiffré a été modifié, ce qu'un CBC laisserait passer en produisant du
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* clair corrompu.
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*
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* La clé vit hors de la base. Une sauvegarde volée ne doit pas suffire à lire
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* ces colonnes — sans quoi le chiffrement ne protège que du vol de disque nu.
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*/
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const ALGORITHM = 'aes-256-gcm';
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const IV_LENGTH = 12;
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const TAG_LENGTH = 16;
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function key(): Buffer {
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return Buffer.from(env.ENCRYPTION_KEY, 'base64');
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}
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/** Format : [iv (12) | tag (16) | chiffré]. */
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export function encrypt(plaintext: string): Buffer {
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const iv = randomBytes(IV_LENGTH);
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const cipher = createCipheriv(ALGORITHM, key(), iv);
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const encrypted = Buffer.concat([
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cipher.update(plaintext, 'utf8'),
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cipher.final(),
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]);
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return Buffer.concat([iv, cipher.getAuthTag(), encrypted]);
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}
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export function decrypt(payload: Uint8Array): string {
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// Prisma 7 renvoie les colonnes `Bytes` en Uint8Array, pas en Buffer.
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const buffer = Buffer.from(payload.buffer, payload.byteOffset, payload.byteLength);
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return decryptBuffer(buffer);
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}
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function decryptBuffer(payload: Buffer): string {
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if (payload.length < IV_LENGTH + TAG_LENGTH) {
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throw new Error('Chiffré invalide : trop court pour contenir iv et tag');
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}
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const iv = payload.subarray(0, IV_LENGTH);
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const tag = payload.subarray(IV_LENGTH, IV_LENGTH + TAG_LENGTH);
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const encrypted = payload.subarray(IV_LENGTH + TAG_LENGTH);
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const decipher = createDecipheriv(ALGORITHM, key(), iv);
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decipher.setAuthTag(tag);
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return Buffer.concat([
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decipher.update(encrypted),
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decipher.final(),
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]).toString('utf8');
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}
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export function encryptOptional(value: string | null | undefined): Buffer | null {
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return value ? encrypt(value) : null;
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}
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export function decryptOptional(
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payload: Uint8Array | null | undefined,
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): string | null {
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return payload ? decrypt(payload) : null;
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}
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/**
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* Empreinte d'un jeton de session ou d'invitation.
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*
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* La base ne stocke que l'empreinte : une fuite de la table ne donne pas de
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* sessions utilisables. SHA-256 suffit ici — le jeton est déjà 256 bits
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* d'aléa, il n'y a pas de dictionnaire à ralentir, contrairement à un mot de
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* passe.
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*/
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export function hashToken(token: string): string {
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return createHash('sha256').update(token).digest('hex');
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}
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export function generateToken(): string {
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return randomBytes(32).toString('base64url');
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}
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/** Comparaison à temps constant, pour ne pas fuiter par la durée. */
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export function safeEqual(a: string, b: string): boolean {
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const bufferA = Buffer.from(a);
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const bufferB = Buffer.from(b);
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if (bufferA.length !== bufferB.length) return false;
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return timingSafeEqual(bufferA, bufferB);
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}
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