mirror of
https://github.com/R0m1k3/xtremflow.git
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Les journaux du serveur montrent la grille Live TV se faire couper en 429 : "Rate limit exceeded", une trentaine de requêtes refusées d'affilée après quelques écrans de défilement. Deux causes cumulées. D'une part le passage du guide de Dio vers AuthedHttp a fait perdre le cache de réponses qui existait auparavant : chaque reconstruction de tuile repartait en requête. Un cache mémoire de dix minutes le rétablit — le backend garde déjà ces réponses trente minutes, il n'y a aucune raison d'aller les rechercher. D'autre part le plafond de deux cents requêtes par minute et par adresse était trop bas pour l'usage réel : une grille demande un logo et un guide par tuile, et tous les clients partagent l'adresse du reverse proxy. Il passe à six cents. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
178 lines
6.0 KiB
Dart
178 lines
6.0 KiB
Dart
import 'package:shelf/shelf.dart';
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import 'dart:async';
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import 'dart:io';
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/// Security Middleware Collection
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///
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/// Includes:
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/// - Honeypot Routes (Trap for bots)
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/// - Security Headers (HSTS, XSS Protection, CSP Report-Only)
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/// - Rate Limiting (Basic DoS protection)
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/// - Login-specific rate limiting (brute-force protection)
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/// Resolve the real client IP.
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/// Honors the first hop of X-Forwarded-For when behind nginx, otherwise
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/// falls back to the socket connection info.
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String clientIpOf(Request request) {
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final forwarded = request.headers['x-forwarded-for'];
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if (forwarded != null && forwarded.isNotEmpty) {
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return forwarded.split(',').first.trim();
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}
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final connectionInfo =
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request.context['shelf.io.connection_info'] as HttpConnectionInfo?;
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return connectionInfo?.remoteAddress.address ?? 'unknown';
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}
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/// 1. Security Headers Middleware
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/// Adds standard security headers to every response.
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Middleware securityHeadersMiddleware() {
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return (Handler handler) {
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return (Request request) async {
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final response = await handler(request);
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return response.change(headers: {
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'X-Content-Type-Options': 'nosniff',
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'X-Frame-Options': 'SAMEORIGIN', // Allow embedding player.html iframes
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'X-XSS-Protection': '1; mode=block',
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'Strict-Transport-Security': 'max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload',
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'Referrer-Policy': 'strict-origin-when-cross-origin',
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// Report-Only first: Flutter Web (CanvasKit/wasm) and google_fonts
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// can break under an enforcing CSP. Promote to enforcing only after
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// a clean soak with no violations in browser consoles.
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'Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only':
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"default-src 'self'; "
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"script-src 'self' 'wasm-unsafe-eval' 'unsafe-eval'; "
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"style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://fonts.googleapis.com; "
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"font-src 'self' https://fonts.gstatic.com; "
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"img-src 'self' data: blob: https:; "
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"media-src 'self' blob:; "
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"connect-src 'self' https://fonts.gstatic.com",
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},);
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};
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};
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}
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/// 2. Honeypot Middleware
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/// Intercepts requests to common vulnerability scanning paths.
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/// Returns a 403 Forbidden immediately and logs the incident.
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Middleware honeypotMiddleware() {
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// list of common bot targets
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const honeypotPaths = [
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'/admin/phpmyadmin',
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'/phpmyadmin',
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'/wp-admin',
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'/wp-login.php',
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'/.env',
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'/config.php',
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'/api/.env',
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'/console',
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'/actuator/health',
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];
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return (Handler handler) {
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return (Request request) {
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final path = request.url.path;
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// Check if path contains any honeypot target
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for (final trap in honeypotPaths) {
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if (path.contains(trap.replaceAll('/', ''))) { // Simple check
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print('SECURITY ALERT: Honeypot triggered by ${clientIpOf(request)} on path: $path');
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return Response.forbidden('Access Denied');
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}
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}
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return handler(request);
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};
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};
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}
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/// 3. Rate Limit Middleware (In-Memory)
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/// Limits requests per IP address.
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/// Default: 200 requests per minute per IP.
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/// 600 plutôt que 200 : une grille de chaînes déclenche une requête de
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/// logo et une de guide par tuile, et tous les clients partagent l'IP du
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/// reverse proxy. Le plafond précédent coupait la grille en 429 au bout de
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/// quelques écrans de défilement.
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Middleware rateLimitMiddleware({int requestsPerMinute = 600}) {
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final clientRequests = <String, List<DateTime>>{};
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// Cleanup timer to remove old entries and prevent memory leaks
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Timer.periodic(const Duration(minutes: 5), (_) {
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final now = DateTime.now();
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clientRequests.removeWhere((_, times) {
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// Remove timestamps older than 1 minute
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times.removeWhere((t) => now.difference(t).inMinutes > 1);
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return times.isEmpty;
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});
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});
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return (Handler handler) {
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return (Request request) {
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final clientIp = clientIpOf(request);
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if (clientIp != 'unknown' && clientIp != '127.0.0.1') {
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final now = DateTime.now();
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// Get or create history for this IP
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final history = clientRequests.putIfAbsent(clientIp, () => []);
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// Clean old requests (older than 1 minute)
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history.removeWhere((t) => now.difference(t).inMinutes >= 1);
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// Check limit
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if (history.length >= requestsPerMinute) {
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print('SECURITY WARN: Rate limit exceeded for $clientIp');
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return Response(429, body: 'Too Many Requests');
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}
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// Add current request
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history.add(now);
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}
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return handler(request);
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};
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};
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}
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/// 4. Login Rate Limit Middleware
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/// Strict per-IP limit on login attempts (brute-force protection),
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/// plus a small delay on each attempt to slow credential stuffing.
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Middleware loginRateLimitMiddleware({int attemptsPerMinute = 10}) {
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final attempts = <String, List<DateTime>>{};
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Timer.periodic(const Duration(minutes: 5), (_) {
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final now = DateTime.now();
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attempts.removeWhere((_, times) {
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times.removeWhere((t) => now.difference(t).inMinutes > 1);
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return times.isEmpty;
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});
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});
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return (Handler handler) {
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return (Request request) async {
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// Only throttle the login POST; other auth routes pass through
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if (!(request.method == 'POST' && request.url.path.endsWith('login'))) {
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return handler(request);
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}
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final clientIp = clientIpOf(request);
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final now = DateTime.now();
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final history = attempts.putIfAbsent(clientIp, () => []);
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history.removeWhere((t) => now.difference(t).inMinutes >= 1);
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if (history.length >= attemptsPerMinute) {
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print('SECURITY WARN: Login rate limit exceeded for $clientIp');
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return Response(429, body: 'Too many login attempts. Try again later.');
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}
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history.add(now);
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final response = await handler(request);
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if (response.statusCode == 401) {
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// Slow down brute-force attempts on failed logins
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await Future.delayed(const Duration(milliseconds: 300));
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}
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return response;
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};
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};
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}
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