Files
xtremflow/bin/middleware/security_middleware.dart
T
MichaelandClaude Fable 5 60d3f42901 feat: security hardening, streaming overhaul, design polish, tests
Security:
- Replace unsalted SHA-256 password hashing with bcrypt (lazy rehash on login)
- Add authenticated /api/xtream-api gateway: Xtream credentials are injected
  server-side and never sent to the frontend; /api/playlists no longer
  returns passwords
- Redact credentials from all logs (login body, proxy/FFmpeg/scheduler URLs)
- Add auth to recordings, EPG, season-passes and streaming routes
  (HttpOnly session cookie for hls.js; loopback bypass for local FFmpeg)
- Lock player postMessage to same-origin in both directions
- Vendor and pin hls.js 1.6.7 / mpegts.js 1.7.3 (drop CDN @latest)
- Fix rate limiter (client IP was never resolved), add login rate limit,
  restrict CORS, add CSP Report-Only, block private-IP SSRF targets,
  fix path traversal in recording log retrieval, chmod 777 -> 770
- Remove dead HiveService (seeded admin/admin into IndexedDB with SHA-256)
- Fix authMiddleware not populating 'user' context (getPlaylist ignored the
  logged-in user; admin purge always returned 403)

Streaming:
- New FfmpegSessionManager: process registry, idle reaper (4 min live /
  15 min VOD), orphan cleanup at startup, clean SIGTERM shutdown,
  fast-fail with stderr instead of 30 s timeout
- Quality selection (source/high/medium/low) for live and VOD; source mode
  streams with -c:v copy (zero transcoding); selector wired into the player
- Concurrent recordings (MAX_CONCURRENT_RECORDINGS, default 2); conflicts
  retry on the next tick instead of silently failing
- Lower live latency (HLS window 20 -> 10 segments, liveSync 10 -> 3)
- Fix recording log lookup (.mp4 vs .mkv mismatch)

Design:
- Replace hardcoded colors with AppColors tokens (12 files)
- web/theme.css syncs HTML players with the Flutter palette
- DPAD/keyboard navigation (arrow-key focus, player shortcuts)
- Tooltips on player icon buttons, Semantics on content cards
- Remove 7 dead widgets broken since the Stitch merge

Quality:
- bin/test/: 21 unit tests (bcrypt, redaction, traversal, SSRF, recording
  conflicts) plus a quality-selector widget test
- GitHub Actions CI (analyze + test + build web)
- Archive stale status docs into docs/archive/

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-10 10:07:18 +02:00

174 lines
5.7 KiB
Dart

import 'package:shelf/shelf.dart';
import 'dart:async';
import 'dart:io';
/// Security Middleware Collection
///
/// Includes:
/// - Honeypot Routes (Trap for bots)
/// - Security Headers (HSTS, XSS Protection, CSP Report-Only)
/// - Rate Limiting (Basic DoS protection)
/// - Login-specific rate limiting (brute-force protection)
/// Resolve the real client IP.
/// Honors the first hop of X-Forwarded-For when behind nginx, otherwise
/// falls back to the socket connection info.
String clientIpOf(Request request) {
final forwarded = request.headers['x-forwarded-for'];
if (forwarded != null && forwarded.isNotEmpty) {
return forwarded.split(',').first.trim();
}
final connectionInfo =
request.context['shelf.io.connection_info'] as HttpConnectionInfo?;
return connectionInfo?.remoteAddress.address ?? 'unknown';
}
/// 1. Security Headers Middleware
/// Adds standard security headers to every response.
Middleware securityHeadersMiddleware() {
return (Handler handler) {
return (Request request) async {
final response = await handler(request);
return response.change(headers: {
'X-Content-Type-Options': 'nosniff',
'X-Frame-Options': 'SAMEORIGIN', // Allow embedding player.html iframes
'X-XSS-Protection': '1; mode=block',
'Strict-Transport-Security': 'max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload',
'Referrer-Policy': 'strict-origin-when-cross-origin',
// Report-Only first: Flutter Web (CanvasKit/wasm) and google_fonts
// can break under an enforcing CSP. Promote to enforcing only after
// a clean soak with no violations in browser consoles.
'Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only':
"default-src 'self'; "
"script-src 'self' 'wasm-unsafe-eval' 'unsafe-eval'; "
"style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://fonts.googleapis.com; "
"font-src 'self' https://fonts.gstatic.com; "
"img-src 'self' data: blob: https:; "
"media-src 'self' blob:; "
"connect-src 'self' https://fonts.gstatic.com",
},);
};
};
}
/// 2. Honeypot Middleware
/// Intercepts requests to common vulnerability scanning paths.
/// Returns a 403 Forbidden immediately and logs the incident.
Middleware honeypotMiddleware() {
// list of common bot targets
const honeypotPaths = [
'/admin/phpmyadmin',
'/phpmyadmin',
'/wp-admin',
'/wp-login.php',
'/.env',
'/config.php',
'/api/.env',
'/console',
'/actuator/health',
];
return (Handler handler) {
return (Request request) {
final path = request.url.path;
// Check if path contains any honeypot target
for (final trap in honeypotPaths) {
if (path.contains(trap.replaceAll('/', ''))) { // Simple check
print('SECURITY ALERT: Honeypot triggered by ${clientIpOf(request)} on path: $path');
return Response.forbidden('Access Denied');
}
}
return handler(request);
};
};
}
/// 3. Rate Limit Middleware (In-Memory)
/// Limits requests per IP address.
/// Default: 200 requests per minute per IP.
Middleware rateLimitMiddleware({int requestsPerMinute = 200}) {
final clientRequests = <String, List<DateTime>>{};
// Cleanup timer to remove old entries and prevent memory leaks
Timer.periodic(const Duration(minutes: 5), (_) {
final now = DateTime.now();
clientRequests.removeWhere((_, times) {
// Remove timestamps older than 1 minute
times.removeWhere((t) => now.difference(t).inMinutes > 1);
return times.isEmpty;
});
});
return (Handler handler) {
return (Request request) {
final clientIp = clientIpOf(request);
if (clientIp != 'unknown' && clientIp != '127.0.0.1') {
final now = DateTime.now();
// Get or create history for this IP
final history = clientRequests.putIfAbsent(clientIp, () => []);
// Clean old requests (older than 1 minute)
history.removeWhere((t) => now.difference(t).inMinutes >= 1);
// Check limit
if (history.length >= requestsPerMinute) {
print('SECURITY WARN: Rate limit exceeded for $clientIp');
return Response(429, body: 'Too Many Requests');
}
// Add current request
history.add(now);
}
return handler(request);
};
};
}
/// 4. Login Rate Limit Middleware
/// Strict per-IP limit on login attempts (brute-force protection),
/// plus a small delay on each attempt to slow credential stuffing.
Middleware loginRateLimitMiddleware({int attemptsPerMinute = 10}) {
final attempts = <String, List<DateTime>>{};
Timer.periodic(const Duration(minutes: 5), (_) {
final now = DateTime.now();
attempts.removeWhere((_, times) {
times.removeWhere((t) => now.difference(t).inMinutes > 1);
return times.isEmpty;
});
});
return (Handler handler) {
return (Request request) async {
// Only throttle the login POST; other auth routes pass through
if (!(request.method == 'POST' && request.url.path.endsWith('login'))) {
return handler(request);
}
final clientIp = clientIpOf(request);
final now = DateTime.now();
final history = attempts.putIfAbsent(clientIp, () => []);
history.removeWhere((t) => now.difference(t).inMinutes >= 1);
if (history.length >= attemptsPerMinute) {
print('SECURITY WARN: Login rate limit exceeded for $clientIp');
return Response(429, body: 'Too many login attempts. Try again later.');
}
history.add(now);
final response = await handler(request);
if (response.statusCode == 401) {
// Slow down brute-force attempts on failed logins
await Future.delayed(const Duration(milliseconds: 300));
}
return response;
};
};
}