mirror of
https://github.com/R0m1k3/xtremflow.git
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Security: - Replace unsalted SHA-256 password hashing with bcrypt (lazy rehash on login) - Add authenticated /api/xtream-api gateway: Xtream credentials are injected server-side and never sent to the frontend; /api/playlists no longer returns passwords - Redact credentials from all logs (login body, proxy/FFmpeg/scheduler URLs) - Add auth to recordings, EPG, season-passes and streaming routes (HttpOnly session cookie for hls.js; loopback bypass for local FFmpeg) - Lock player postMessage to same-origin in both directions - Vendor and pin hls.js 1.6.7 / mpegts.js 1.7.3 (drop CDN @latest) - Fix rate limiter (client IP was never resolved), add login rate limit, restrict CORS, add CSP Report-Only, block private-IP SSRF targets, fix path traversal in recording log retrieval, chmod 777 -> 770 - Remove dead HiveService (seeded admin/admin into IndexedDB with SHA-256) - Fix authMiddleware not populating 'user' context (getPlaylist ignored the logged-in user; admin purge always returned 403) Streaming: - New FfmpegSessionManager: process registry, idle reaper (4 min live / 15 min VOD), orphan cleanup at startup, clean SIGTERM shutdown, fast-fail with stderr instead of 30 s timeout - Quality selection (source/high/medium/low) for live and VOD; source mode streams with -c:v copy (zero transcoding); selector wired into the player - Concurrent recordings (MAX_CONCURRENT_RECORDINGS, default 2); conflicts retry on the next tick instead of silently failing - Lower live latency (HLS window 20 -> 10 segments, liveSync 10 -> 3) - Fix recording log lookup (.mp4 vs .mkv mismatch) Design: - Replace hardcoded colors with AppColors tokens (12 files) - web/theme.css syncs HTML players with the Flutter palette - DPAD/keyboard navigation (arrow-key focus, player shortcuts) - Tooltips on player icon buttons, Semantics on content cards - Remove 7 dead widgets broken since the Stitch merge Quality: - bin/test/: 21 unit tests (bcrypt, redaction, traversal, SSRF, recording conflicts) plus a quality-selector widget test - GitHub Actions CI (analyze + test + build web) - Archive stale status docs into docs/archive/ Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
174 lines
5.7 KiB
Dart
174 lines
5.7 KiB
Dart
import 'package:shelf/shelf.dart';
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import 'dart:async';
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import 'dart:io';
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/// Security Middleware Collection
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///
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/// Includes:
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/// - Honeypot Routes (Trap for bots)
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/// - Security Headers (HSTS, XSS Protection, CSP Report-Only)
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/// - Rate Limiting (Basic DoS protection)
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/// - Login-specific rate limiting (brute-force protection)
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/// Resolve the real client IP.
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/// Honors the first hop of X-Forwarded-For when behind nginx, otherwise
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/// falls back to the socket connection info.
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String clientIpOf(Request request) {
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final forwarded = request.headers['x-forwarded-for'];
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if (forwarded != null && forwarded.isNotEmpty) {
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return forwarded.split(',').first.trim();
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}
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final connectionInfo =
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request.context['shelf.io.connection_info'] as HttpConnectionInfo?;
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return connectionInfo?.remoteAddress.address ?? 'unknown';
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}
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/// 1. Security Headers Middleware
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/// Adds standard security headers to every response.
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Middleware securityHeadersMiddleware() {
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return (Handler handler) {
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return (Request request) async {
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final response = await handler(request);
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return response.change(headers: {
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'X-Content-Type-Options': 'nosniff',
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'X-Frame-Options': 'SAMEORIGIN', // Allow embedding player.html iframes
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'X-XSS-Protection': '1; mode=block',
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'Strict-Transport-Security': 'max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload',
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'Referrer-Policy': 'strict-origin-when-cross-origin',
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// Report-Only first: Flutter Web (CanvasKit/wasm) and google_fonts
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// can break under an enforcing CSP. Promote to enforcing only after
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// a clean soak with no violations in browser consoles.
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'Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only':
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"default-src 'self'; "
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"script-src 'self' 'wasm-unsafe-eval' 'unsafe-eval'; "
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"style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://fonts.googleapis.com; "
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"font-src 'self' https://fonts.gstatic.com; "
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"img-src 'self' data: blob: https:; "
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"media-src 'self' blob:; "
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"connect-src 'self' https://fonts.gstatic.com",
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},);
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};
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};
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}
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/// 2. Honeypot Middleware
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/// Intercepts requests to common vulnerability scanning paths.
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/// Returns a 403 Forbidden immediately and logs the incident.
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Middleware honeypotMiddleware() {
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// list of common bot targets
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const honeypotPaths = [
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'/admin/phpmyadmin',
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'/phpmyadmin',
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'/wp-admin',
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'/wp-login.php',
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'/.env',
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'/config.php',
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'/api/.env',
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'/console',
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'/actuator/health',
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];
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return (Handler handler) {
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return (Request request) {
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final path = request.url.path;
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// Check if path contains any honeypot target
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for (final trap in honeypotPaths) {
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if (path.contains(trap.replaceAll('/', ''))) { // Simple check
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print('SECURITY ALERT: Honeypot triggered by ${clientIpOf(request)} on path: $path');
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return Response.forbidden('Access Denied');
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}
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}
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return handler(request);
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};
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};
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}
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/// 3. Rate Limit Middleware (In-Memory)
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/// Limits requests per IP address.
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/// Default: 200 requests per minute per IP.
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Middleware rateLimitMiddleware({int requestsPerMinute = 200}) {
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final clientRequests = <String, List<DateTime>>{};
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// Cleanup timer to remove old entries and prevent memory leaks
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Timer.periodic(const Duration(minutes: 5), (_) {
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final now = DateTime.now();
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clientRequests.removeWhere((_, times) {
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// Remove timestamps older than 1 minute
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times.removeWhere((t) => now.difference(t).inMinutes > 1);
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return times.isEmpty;
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});
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});
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return (Handler handler) {
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return (Request request) {
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final clientIp = clientIpOf(request);
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if (clientIp != 'unknown' && clientIp != '127.0.0.1') {
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final now = DateTime.now();
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// Get or create history for this IP
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final history = clientRequests.putIfAbsent(clientIp, () => []);
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// Clean old requests (older than 1 minute)
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history.removeWhere((t) => now.difference(t).inMinutes >= 1);
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// Check limit
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if (history.length >= requestsPerMinute) {
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print('SECURITY WARN: Rate limit exceeded for $clientIp');
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return Response(429, body: 'Too Many Requests');
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}
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// Add current request
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history.add(now);
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}
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return handler(request);
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};
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};
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}
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/// 4. Login Rate Limit Middleware
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/// Strict per-IP limit on login attempts (brute-force protection),
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/// plus a small delay on each attempt to slow credential stuffing.
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Middleware loginRateLimitMiddleware({int attemptsPerMinute = 10}) {
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final attempts = <String, List<DateTime>>{};
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Timer.periodic(const Duration(minutes: 5), (_) {
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final now = DateTime.now();
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attempts.removeWhere((_, times) {
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times.removeWhere((t) => now.difference(t).inMinutes > 1);
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return times.isEmpty;
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});
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});
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return (Handler handler) {
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return (Request request) async {
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// Only throttle the login POST; other auth routes pass through
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if (!(request.method == 'POST' && request.url.path.endsWith('login'))) {
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return handler(request);
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}
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final clientIp = clientIpOf(request);
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final now = DateTime.now();
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final history = attempts.putIfAbsent(clientIp, () => []);
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history.removeWhere((t) => now.difference(t).inMinutes >= 1);
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if (history.length >= attemptsPerMinute) {
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print('SECURITY WARN: Login rate limit exceeded for $clientIp');
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return Response(429, body: 'Too many login attempts. Try again later.');
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}
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history.add(now);
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final response = await handler(request);
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if (response.statusCode == 401) {
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// Slow down brute-force attempts on failed logins
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await Future.delayed(const Duration(milliseconds: 300));
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}
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return response;
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};
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};
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}
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