Files
xtremflow/bin/api/proxy_handler.dart
T
Claude ea63314ba7 Durcit la sécurité du backend et du player
Proxy /api/xtream :
- Authentification de session rétablie (Authorization ou cookie HttpOnly
  session — les requêtes navigateur même-origine le portent) ; le proxy
  était volontairement ouvert, offrant un rebond SSRF non authentifié
- Redirections suivies manuellement avec revalidation à chaque saut
  (hôte privé interdit + allowlist de domaine) : avec followRedirects,
  seule l'URL initiale était validée, une 302 amont suffisait pour
  atteindre un hôte interne
- Erreurs proxy sans détail d'exception (ClientException porte l'URL
  amont, credentials Xtream inclus), logs redactés

Logs :
- redactedLogRequests remplace logRequests() de shelf : l'URI de
  /api/xtream/<url> écrivait username/password Xtream en clair à chaque
  requête, annulant l'effort de LogRedactor partout ailleurs
- Les 500 d'epg_api ne renvoient plus e.toString() au client (même
  risque ClientException) ; détail redacté en log serveur

Middleware :
- X-Forwarded-For honoré uniquement depuis un proxy de confiance
  (loopback + RFC1918 par défaut, surchargables via TRUSTED_PROXIES) :
  un client direct forgeait l'en-tête et contournait le rate limit
  global comme la limite de tentatives de login
- Honeypot comparé sur chemin exact/préfixe : l'ancien
  contains(trap.replaceAll('/','')) bloquait toute URL contenant
  console, env ou wpadmin, y compris des URLs proxifiées légitimes

Comptes :
- Mot de passe admin initial aléatoire (Random.secure, affiché une fois
  au démarrage) ou ADMIN_INITIAL_PASSWORD ; fini le admin/admin persistant
- Longueur minimale de 8 caractères à la création et au changement

Divers :
- CleanupService ne cible plus Directory.systemTemp en récursif (il
  supprimait les temporaires de la VM Dart et le parent des sessions HLS)
- web/xf-player-core.js : postMessage vers location.origin au lieu de
  '*', et filtrage d'event.origin à la réception (le côté Flutter le
  faisait déjà)

Validé : dart analyze (0 issue) et dart test (48/48) sur bin/.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015oEu9QayWsw7hCKhenxgVa
2026-08-27 12:19:58 +00:00

304 lines
11 KiB
Dart

import 'dart:async';
import 'dart:convert';
import 'dart:io';
import 'package:shelf/shelf.dart';
import 'package:http/http.dart' as http;
import '../database/database.dart';
import '../middleware/auth_middleware.dart';
import '../models/playlist_config.dart';
import '../utils/log_redactor.dart';
/// Returns true when [host] must never be proxied (loopback, private LAN,
/// link-local/cloud-metadata ranges) — SSRF protection for asset URLs that
/// bypass the playlist-domain allowlist.
bool isForbiddenProxyHost(String host) {
final lower = host.toLowerCase();
if (lower == 'localhost' || lower == '::1') return true;
final ip = InternetAddress.tryParse(lower);
if (ip == null) return false; // Hostname: validated by domain allowlist path
if (ip.isLoopback || ip.isLinkLocal) return true;
if (ip.type == InternetAddressType.IPv4) {
final parts = ip.address.split('.').map(int.parse).toList();
if (parts[0] == 10) return true; // 10.0.0.0/8
if (parts[0] == 172 && parts[1] >= 16 && parts[1] <= 31) return true;
if (parts[0] == 192 && parts[1] == 168) return true; // 192.168.0.0/16
if (parts[0] == 169 && parts[1] == 254) return true; // metadata/link-local
if (parts[0] == 0) return true;
}
return false;
}
/// Handler for the Xtream Proxy
class ProxyHandler {
final Future<PlaylistConfig?> Function(Request) _getPlaylist;
final AppDatabase _db;
final http.Client _client = http.Client();
final Map<String, (PlaylistConfig, DateTime)> _playlistCache = {};
static const _cacheDuration = Duration(minutes: 5);
static const _allowedHeaders = [
'content-type',
'content-range',
'accept-ranges',
'cache-control',
'server',
'date',
];
static const _allowedRequestHeaders = [
'user-agent',
'accept',
'range',
'referer',
];
Future<PlaylistConfig?> _getCachedPlaylist(Request request) async {
// Basic caching to avoid DB overhead on every video segment
final now = DateTime.now();
const cacheKey =
'global_playlist'; // Currently app has one primary playlist per user/global
if (_playlistCache.containsKey(cacheKey)) {
final (cached, expiry) = _playlistCache[cacheKey]!;
if (now.isBefore(expiry)) return cached;
}
final playlist = await _getPlaylist(request);
if (playlist != null) {
_playlistCache[cacheKey] = (playlist, now.add(_cacheDuration));
}
return playlist;
}
ProxyHandler(this._getPlaylist, this._db);
/// Create Xtream proxy handler with M3U8 URL rewriting support
Handler get handler {
return (Request request) async {
final path = request.url.path;
// Only handle /api/xtream/* requests
// CRITICAL: Check path BEFORE anything else so non-proxy requests fall through to static handler
if (!path.startsWith('api/xtream/')) {
// Return 404 so Cascade tries next handler (streamingRouter)
return Response.notFound(null);
}
// Authentification par session. Les requêtes initiées par le navigateur
// (img src, hls.js) ne portent pas d'en-tête Authorization mais envoient
// le cookie HttpOnly `session` (SameSite=Lax, même origine) posé au
// login : extractAuthToken accepte les deux. Un proxy ouvert offrait un
// rebond SSRF non authentifié vers n'importe quel hôte public via les
// extensions d'image.
final token = extractAuthToken(request);
if (token == null || _db.findSessionByToken(token) == null) {
return Response(401, body: 'Unauthorized');
}
Uri? targetUrl;
// === PROXY LOGIC ===
try {
// Extract target URL from request
// Format: /api/xtream/http://server:port/path
String apiPath = path.substring('api/xtream/'.length);
// Decode URL if it's encoded
if (apiPath.startsWith('http%3A') || apiPath.startsWith('https%3A')) {
apiPath = Uri.decodeComponent(apiPath);
}
if (!apiPath.startsWith('http://') && !apiPath.startsWith('https://')) {
return Response.badRequest(
body: 'Invalid API URL. Expected format: /api/xtream/http://...',
);
}
String fullUrl = apiPath;
if (request.url.query.isNotEmpty) {
if (fullUrl.contains('?')) {
fullUrl = '$fullUrl&${request.url.query}';
} else {
fullUrl = '$fullUrl?${request.url.query}';
}
}
targetUrl = Uri.parse(fullUrl);
// Only plain http(s) may be proxied
if (targetUrl.scheme != 'http' && targetUrl.scheme != 'https') {
return Response.forbidden('Unsupported URL scheme');
}
// Never proxy to loopback/private/link-local targets (SSRF)
if (isForbiddenProxyHost(targetUrl.host)) {
print('[Proxy] Blocked SSRF attempt to private host: ${targetUrl.host}');
return Response.forbidden('Access to this host is forbidden');
}
// SSRF Protection - but allow images/static assets from any host
// Xtream providers often use separate CDN servers for picons/images
final isStaticAsset = targetUrl.path.endsWith('.png') ||
targetUrl.path.endsWith('.jpg') ||
targetUrl.path.endsWith('.jpeg') ||
targetUrl.path.endsWith('.gif') ||
targetUrl.path.endsWith('.webp') ||
targetUrl.path.endsWith('.ico') ||
targetUrl.path.contains('/picons/') ||
targetUrl.path.contains('/logos/');
String? allowedHost;
if (!isStaticAsset) {
// For API calls, enforce domain allowlist
final playlist = await _getCachedPlaylist(request);
if (playlist == null) {
return Response.forbidden(
'No active playlist configuration found to validate request',
);
}
final targetHost = targetUrl.host.toLowerCase();
allowedHost = Uri.parse(playlist.dns).host.toLowerCase();
if (targetHost != allowedHost) {
print(
'[Proxy] Blocked SSRF attempt to $targetHost (Allowed: $allowedHost)',
);
return Response.forbidden(
'Access to this domain is forbidden by policy',
);
}
}
final proxyHeaders = <String, String>{
'User-Agent': 'VLC/3.0.18 LibVLC/3.0.18',
'Accept': '*/*',
'Accept-Encoding': 'identity',
'Keep-Alive': 'timeout=30, max=100', // Request persistent connection
};
// Forward Range header if present
if (request.headers['range'] != null) {
proxyHeaders['range'] = request.headers['range']!;
}
try {
print('[Proxy] Forwarding to: ${LogRedactor.redactUrl(targetUrl.toString())}');
// Forward safe request headers
for (final header in _allowedRequestHeaders) {
if (request.headers.containsKey(header)) {
proxyHeaders[header] = request.headers[header]!;
}
}
List<int>? postBody;
if (request.method == 'POST') {
final bodyBytes = await request.read().toList();
postBody = bodyBytes.expand((i) => i).toList();
}
// Redirections suivies MANUELLEMENT : chaque destination est
// revalidée (hôte privé, allowlist de domaine). Avec
// followRedirects, la validation ne portait que sur l'URL
// initiale — une 302 du serveur amont suffisait pour atteindre
// un hôte interne malgré l'anti-SSRF.
http.StreamedResponse response;
var currentUrl = targetUrl;
var redirects = 0;
while (true) {
final proxyRequest = http.Request(request.method, currentUrl);
proxyRequest.headers.addAll(proxyHeaders);
proxyRequest.followRedirects = false;
if (postBody != null) proxyRequest.bodyBytes = postBody;
// Added 90s timeout to allow frontend (60s) to time out gracefully first
response = await _client
.send(proxyRequest)
.timeout(const Duration(seconds: 90));
final location = response.headers['location'];
final isRedirect = response.statusCode >= 300 &&
response.statusCode < 400 &&
location != null;
if (!isRedirect) break;
if (++redirects > 3) {
return Response.forbidden('Too many redirects');
}
final next = Uri.parse(location);
currentUrl = next.isAbsolute ? next : currentUrl.resolve(location);
if (currentUrl.scheme != 'http' && currentUrl.scheme != 'https') {
return Response.forbidden('Unsupported redirect scheme');
}
if (isForbiddenProxyHost(currentUrl.host)) {
print(
'[Proxy] Blocked SSRF redirect to private host: ${currentUrl.host}',
);
return Response.forbidden('Access to this host is forbidden');
}
if (allowedHost != null &&
currentUrl.host.toLowerCase() != allowedHost) {
print(
'[Proxy] Blocked redirect to ${currentUrl.host} (Allowed: $allowedHost)',
);
return Response.forbidden(
'Access to this domain is forbidden by policy',
);
}
}
// Build response headers from source response
final responseHeaders = <String, String>{
'access-control-allow-origin': '*',
'connection': 'keep-alive',
'keep-alive': 'timeout=30',
};
// Forward specific safe headers
for (final header in _allowedHeaders) {
if (response.headers.containsKey(header)) {
responseHeaders[header] = response.headers[header]!;
}
}
// ALWAYS stream the response for maximum performance and to avoid memory issues with large JSONs
return Response(
response.statusCode,
body: response.stream,
headers: responseHeaders,
);
} catch (e) {
rethrow;
}
} catch (e) {
// Redaction : une ClientException porte l'URL amont, credentials
// Xtream inclus. Jamais de détail d'exception vers le client.
print(
'[ProxyHandler] error on ${LogRedactor.redactUrl(path)}: '
'${LogRedactor.redactUrl('$e')}',
);
// Return transparent 1x1 pixel image fallback for images
if (targetUrl?.path.endsWith('.png') == true ||
targetUrl?.path.endsWith('.jpg') == true) {
return Response.ok(
base64Decode(
'iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAEAAAABCAQAAAC1HAwCAAAAC0lEQVR42mNkYAAAAAYAAjCB0C8AAAAASUVORK5CYII=',
),
headers: {'content-type': 'image/png'},
);
}
return Response.internalServerError(
body: jsonEncode({'error': 'Proxy error'}),
headers: {'content-type': 'application/json'},
);
}
};
}
}